Collision at Sea

Naval History, December 2005

NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER

The USS Floyd B. Parks (DD-884) docked at Subic Bay in the Philippines shortly after her 11 March 1956 collision with the USS Columbus (CA-74). Workers at the base fitted the destroyer with a temporary bow (inset) to allow her to steam back to the United States for permanent repairs.

A Cold War exercise turned tragic after poor signaling led two U.S. Navy warships to collide in the South China Sea, slicing off the bow of the destroyer USS Floyd B. Parks.

The night of Sunday 11 March 1956 was moonless with the sky partly overcast. Shortly before 0400, a U.S. Seventh Fleet task force of two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, and four destroyers, steaming at 18 knots on a heading of 260 degrees, prepared to engage in night air defense maneuvers in the South China Sea. The eight ships steamed in darkness with their radios and radars secured, observing electronic silence and darken ship procedures. In the opening minutes of this Cold War training exercise code-named ADEX-10, the 13,600-ton Baltimore-class heavy cruiser USS Columbus (CA-74) collided with and sheared off the bow of the 2,425-ton Gearing-class destroyer USS Floyd B. Parks (DD-884).

"A Roaring Cacophony of Steel"

I was an 18-year-old deck division seaman berthed aft in the Columbus, on the second deck. A light sleeper, I awakened suddenly to the cruiser shuddering in its forward motion. The stern was shaking, though not as it did when the screws were being backed against the ship's speed. This was almost a bucking motion. As I stood in the darkness groping for the bunk chain and my dungarees, an astounding jolt jarred the Columbus sideways. Loud banging noises boomed from a forward passageway.

A warning from the bridge over the ship's loudspeaker system declared a collision and summoned, "All hands topside." Sans my dungarees, I scrambled up a nearby starboard hatch ladder. As I was spinning open the scuttle's locking dogs someone began turning on lights in the compartment. I pushed the scuttle open and poked my head and shoulders topside. The noise was so loud it was shocking, a thunderous, roaring cacophony of steel being ripped and twisted. I feared we had collided with a carrier.

I later learned that, forward, all that was visible was a high, red light, an aircraft warning light on the truck of the Parks' mast. Unable to see into the darkness, and addled by the fury of the noise, I feared moving up the ladder to step on deck. Dreading an oncoming tumble of debris I stood fast, mindless of blocking egress through the scuttle.

When I made out the ship to the Columbus' starboard as a destroyer, my fear eased. I climbed through the scuttle to stand on the main deck, an astonished spectator. The disabled destroyer was passing by little more than a dozen feet away, its bridge structure drawing near. The destroyer was being held tightly against the cruiser's side as the larger ship raked past. The noise remained an excruciating howl, a dreadful screech of steel being tortured, punctuated by thunderous banging. Bursts of smoky sparks flashed in the night, and the air smelled of ozone and heated metal. A battle lantern flared in the destroyer's pilothouse, light enough to silhouette several men moving wildly about the destroyer's bridge, helpless to control their ship's entangled skid.

The grinding together of the two ships was doing additional damage to both vessels. Aboard the cruiser the starboard motor whaleboat was torn away, along with boat booms, a screw guard, and much of an anti-aircraft gun tub and its supporting sponson. Nearly all the destroyer's port side structure was being ripped and mangled, and in several places the hull was being torn and punctured.

As the destroyer cleared the cruiser's stern a searchlight from the Columbus' signal bridge was turned on, its intense beam of light focused on the Parks' bow area. Illuminated in the glow of the searchlight was a cluttered mess of debris where the destroyer's bow had been ripped away up to the Parks' forward 5-inch gun turret. The turret was pushed around to starboard, with its two cannons shoved up at odd angles. The Parks had been struck near frame 18, at just about the middle of the chief petty officers' quarters.

As more searchlights were lighted aboard both vessels, the sea in the wakes of the ships was illuminated by shafts of light dancing in frantic searches for anyone in the ocean. No one could be seen in the nearby water, the surface of which was streaked with thick oil. The Columbus, holding headway, was moving slowly to port. The Parks, meanwhile, lay dead in the water. In contrast to the dreadful roar of the collision, the night embraced a stunning quiet. The seascape blazed with searchlights so that the scene on the ocean was almost theater-like and surreal.

The Parks was eerily illuminated and slightly down by the bow. The huge gaping hole where the ship's bow had once been gave the vessel the look of some mortally wounded sea creature.

Losses aboard the destroyer were serious but would have been much worse had the ship's air defenses not been manned, with the crew at a state of general quarters. The ship's watertight integrity had been established before the Columbus sheared off more than 50 feet of the Parks' bow. Two seamen assigned to a battle station in the bow of the destroyer were missing. Never found, they were declared lost at sea. Five other enlisted men aboard the Parks were injured, including one man trapped in a forward compartment. He suffered a head injury and was scalded by steam from a ruptured line.

Damage control by repair parties aboard the Parks prevented flooding in the ship from becoming critical immediately following the collision, and the captain credited repair crews with preventing the ship's sinking.

NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE

The USS Columbus, seen here in happier days as she preapres to depart on a summer training cruise for Naval Academy midshipmen on 6 June 1955. The cruiser was the task force guide during the ADEX 10 exercise and her high-speed turn to starboard led to the fatal collision with the Parks.

The Parks' severed bow capsized as it passed down the Columbus' port side, yet it continued to float. At daylight, crewmen aboard the Columbus unsuccessfully tried for several hours to take the bow wreckage in tow. Later in the day, another destroyer from the task force, the USS John R. Craig (DD-885), was assigned to track the bow and remained with it for nearly 40 hours until it sank in a 2,350-fathom-deep area and in sight of an arriving salvage ship, the USS Conserver (ARS-39).

The Court of Inquiry

Within six days a court of inquiry had assembled at the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay, on the Philippine island of Luzon. The collision occurred some 250 miles west of the base, and after attempts by the Columbus to take the Parks in tow failed, the destroyer set out for Subic Bay steaming stern first at about five knots. The Columbus steamed close by in escort.

The inquiry at Subic spanned ten days and called 57 witnesses to testify. Many answered questions about the visual signaling of the tactical message sent from the task force flagship, the USS Shangri-La (CVA-38), to the other ships in the force. A picture soon emerged from the testimony that revealed presumptions and elementary errors among the staff of Commander Carrier Division Five (COMCARDIVFIVE) aboard the Shangri-La, headed by Rear Admiral Aaron P. Storrs.

The investigation revealed a series of signaling errors that led to the collision. In preparing to turn the ships taking part in ADEX-10, the COMCARDIVFIVE staff tactical watch officer on duty in the flagship plotting room spoke to a signalman on the signal bridge over a speaker phone conveying the message he wanted signaled to the task force. The message, as drafted by the signalman and later confirmed by the watch officer read: "TURN ZERO THREE FIVE TACK SPEED TWO ZERO TACK TANGO ZERO THREE FIVE ZERO." This tactical order was intended to turn the task force to the right, in a single 135 degree turn, bringing the eight ships onto a flight course from which the Shangri-La would launch aircraft. The staff officer intended that at 0350 all ships would engage in the simultaneous turns to starboard using right standard rudder. Planes would launch at 0400.

Because some ships had not responded to the Shangri-La's signalers, it was nearing 0350 and the tactical message had yet to be sent. In a last-minute squawkbox conversation with the signalman on the Shangri-La's signal bridge, the flag plot staff watch officer decided to send the message as a signal to be executed immediately, and he ordered it flashed over the carrier's yardarm blinker lights. The time noted in the message was overlooked, and the signalman did not question it.

A Blurred Signal

The quartermaster third class working the telegraph key to flash the yardarm lights, a 12-year Navy veteran, was too quick with his key strokes. The lamp intensity of the yardarm lights hardly dimmed between flashes, causing the signal to blur. Only parts of the message were clear to units in the task force that saw it. Adding to the confusion was the time noted in the message, ". . . TANGO ZERO THREE FIVE ZERO," which was confusing because the message was in transmission later than 0350. The time of delivery noted for the message was about 0354, but this varied between ships.

Once the tactical message was flashed over yardarm lights, crews in the formation who were unable to read it began signaling the flagship by infrared directional lights asking for repeats. By IR directional light from the Shangri-La's signal bridge, repeats were sent to three ships, of which the Columbus was one. While the calls for repeats were being worked by the Shangri-La's signalmen, there was a delay in finishing the tactical message over the yardarm blinker lights, specifically the "IX, IX, IX ------ signal calling for immediate execution of the order. Before the signal to execute was finally flashed, one ship, the USS Helena (CA-75), had already turned based on the time noted in the message. On other ships, signalmen unable to read the entire message had not requested repeats.

The Columbus was the designated guide ship for the task force. After receiving the tactical order on a requested repeat and catching the delayed signal to execute the order, the officer of the deck on the Columbus ordered his ship's speed increased to 20 knots and called for right standard rudder, taking the cruiser into a starboard turn.

The Parks and the carrier USS Kearsarge (CVA-33), both off to the Columbus' starboard quarter, had missed signals from the flagship. The Parks had not seen the tactical signal nor the delayed signal to execute, while the Kearsarge, to the Parks' starboard, after having received the tactical message by directional light on a requested repeat, missed seeing the signal to execute. Both ships remained steaming on their established courses after the Columbus, as the task force guide, had increased speed and engaged in a turn to starboard. Initially, lookouts on the Columbus, Parks, and Kearsarge failed to observe the cruiser's closing movement. The Kearsarge OOD was first to see her approaching and, moments before the Columbus struck the Parks, ordered right full rudder to the carrier's helm.

NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE

Signalmen on the USS Des Moines (CA-134) flash a message to units of the Sixth Fleet during a 1958 exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. The original tactical message sent during ADEX-10 was not flashed in this more traditional manner but rather by a telegraph key that activated yardarm blinker lights. The operator's key strokes were too fast, resulting in a blurred signal that led to the collision

Commander Joseph F. Gustaferro, captain of the Parks, had been on the bridge for nearly 30 minutes before the accident. His signalman, a quartermaster striker of limited experience, was watching for signals from the flagship, while the port lookout had been alerted by the captain to keep watch on the Columbus. The captain had been eyeing the cruiser himself, but was focusing much of his attention on the carrier steaming off the Parks' starboard quarter. Commander Gustaferro also directed his OOD to pay close attention to the movements of the Kearsarge, watching the carrier for a likely turn to starboard.

Seconds before the collision, records note that the captain of the Parks entered the pilothouse from the starboard wing of the bridge in response to warnings that the Columbus was bearing down from port. Seeing that collision was imminent, the captain immediately took the conn. He ordered the destroyer's engines backed full, called for right hard rudder from the helmsman, and sounded three blasts on the ship's whistle.

Aboard the Columbus, Captain George C. Seay had been awakened nearly 25 minutes past his 0330 call time, a failure attributed to the OOD. Captain Seay told investigators that when he arrived on the bridge, just minutes before the collision, he noted the Parks at about 1,000 yards distance and about three points forward of the Columbus' starboard beam. Informed of the status of his ship by his officer of the deck, Captain Seay thought the Parks was also turning, so that when his OOD reported that the bearing on the Parks was steady, the captain replied, "The bearing's not suppose to change." The OOD then stated he did not believe the Parks was turning and ordered, "Steady as you go" to the helm. Watching the Parks from the starboard bridge wing, Captain Seay then called for left full rudder, an order the OOD immediately passed to the helmsman. The captain later stated he did not order the ship's engines backed in order to avoid striking the Parks amidships. The deck log for the Columbus holds that the collision occurred at 0359 and the ship's engines were ordered stopped at 0400.

NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE

The repaired Parks under way in October 1956. Commissioned on 31 July 1945, she was named for Major Floyd. B. Parks, USMC, commander of VMF-221 who was killed in action defending Midway Island on 4 June 1942. The destroyer had a long career, seeing action in both the Korean and Vietnam wars before finally being scrapped in April 1974.

The court's opinion was that "the operational uncertainty resulting from the improper drafting, faulty and delayed transmission, and uncertain execution of the turn signal, which was not received by some of the ships, received by others at various times, and executed at different times by various ships of the formation, set in motion a series of events leading to the collision between USS Columbus (CA-74) and USS Floyd B. Parks (DD-884)."

But Admiral Felix B. Stump, the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, was unable to mask his ire over the accident. He was troubled about resting any blame for the signaling fiasco upon the enlisted quartermasters carrying out signaling from the task force flagship. In his review of the court of inquiry's recommendations for discipline, he wrote:

CINCPACFLT disagrees most strongly with this inverted concept of responsibility. It is indicative of the type of loose control—the type of negligent reliance upon subordinates—which helped to bring about the disaster under investigation. The loose control is epitomized by the fact that the senior signalman on duty on the tactical flagship was a third class petty officer. Never in my entire service at sea as officer of the deck, navigator, executive officer, captain, and flag officer, have I known a task force to be maneuvered at night by visual signals without the best available talent being present on the signal bridge.

Ultimate responsibility for the collision was placed on the OOD of the Columbus, an able mariner who in a timely manner had his ship where it was supposed to be, coming right under standard rudder to a new course into the wind. Though the court of inquiry questioned the performances of officers on three ships and named a number of interested parties (an individual whose conduct is subject to review), none of its disciplinary recommendations was followed. Even today the Navy's JAG office shrouds the board's recommendations in secrecy, citing, in addition to privacy rights, the December 1956 decision of Admiral Stump, which in part states:

. . . in the search for the equities involved in specific cases, it becomes apparent that there exists an interlocking relationship in an entire series of actions throughout the task force. Equity demands one of two approaches in this instance. Either start afresh and reassess the conduct of all concerned with a broader approach, or, in the light of all the circumstances, determine now that error in varying degrees is so widespread that specific disciplinary action will serve no useful purpose.

Following this Cold War mishap came recommendations for changes in visual signaling among Navy ships. Senior naval planners concluded that, regardless of advances in electronic and radio-telephone communications, there remained a need aboard Navy ships for personnel exclusively trained and highly versed in visual signaling. Responding to this, on 27 April 1956, six weeks after the Columbus-Parks collision, the Chief of Naval Personnel issued BUPERS Notice 1223, noting the secretary of the Navy's decision to eliminate the combined rating of Quartermaster /S/ (Signalman) and establish the general service rating of Signalman dedicated exclusively to visual signaling at sea.

Sources:

Finding of Facts, and the Opinions of the Court of Inquiry.
The court of inquiry's 463 page record of testimony.

The deck logs of the USS Columbus, USS Floyd B. Parks, USS John R. Craig, and USS Kearsarge.

The following endorsements to the court of inquiry's proceedings into the collision: Fifth Endorsement by CINCPACFLT, dated 1 December 1956, and Sixth Endorsement by JAG, dated 10 July 1957. (Endorsements by COMSEVENTHFLT, COMCRUDESPAC, and COMAIRPAC are no longer readily available in records held by JAG or other commands. Also, there appears to be missing an earlier endorsement by CINCPACFLT which may have called for COMAIRPAC's separate inquiry into certain aspects of the collision not explored by the court of inquiry conducted at Subic Bay. Findings of a later inquiry conducted by COMAIRPAC, once included as an attachment to CINCPACFLT'S Fifth Endorsement, is also missing.)

Mr. Joy enlisted in the Navy in 1954. Along with serving in the Columbus, he also served in the cruisers USS Roanoke (CL-145), USS Springfield (CLG-7), and USS Little Rock (CLG-4) as a rated photographer's mate. He retired from the Navy in 1973 as a chief photographer's mate.