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GD Completes USS Ohio Conversion
Defense Daily, 26 Jan 06
U.S. Needs Nuclear Weapons And Capability To Upgrade Them, DoE Official Says
By Geoff Fein, Defense Daily, 26 Jan 06
Report: Guam sailor killed in traffic crash
Stars and Stripes Pacific edition, 29 Jan 06
Navy focusing training on detecting China's advanced diesel subs
Audrey McAvoy, Associated Press (Cleveland Plain Dealer), 29 Jan 06
"Alternative QDR" Bonkers?
Joe Buff, Military.com, 27 Jan 06
AUDIT FINDS ‘MAJOR’ PROBLEMS IN SHIPYARDS’ EARNED
Christopher J. Castelli, Inside the Navy, 30 Jan 06
Goal of 313 ships not cited in draft
DRAFT QDR, RUMSFELD EMPHASIZE FLEET’S CAPABILITIES OVER NUMBERS
By Chris Johnson, Inside the Navy, 30 Jan 06
New Pier Is Good News For Submarine Base And The Region
$31 million structure to better serve Navy's newer attack vessels
By Anthony Cronin, New London Day, 29 Jan 06
Victories for prosecutors
A former official at a key maker of submarine valves is sent to prison for his
role in the fraud.
A former high-ranking official at a supplier of valves for nuclear-powered Navy submarines has been sentenced to two years in prison for falsifying quality-control documents about the valves'
By peter Djardin, Daily Press, 28 Jan 06
Sub commander fighting to clear name
By Jeff Schogol, Star and Stripes Mideast Edition, 29 Jan 06
Future Of Submarines And Electric Boat
New London Day, 29 Jan 06
Countering subs
News & Observer, 28 Jan 06
Safecracker reveals old sub's secrets
By Ana M. Alaya, Newark Star Ledger, 29 Jan 06
Korea Offers To Sell Subs To Indonesia
By Lee Jin-woo, Staff Reporter, Korea Times, January 28, 2006
Russia to build another fourth-generation submarine of new Borey-class
Sevmash plant will commemorate 100 years anniversary of the Russian submarine
fleet with the laying the keel of the third strategic submarine of the new Borey-class,
Interfax reported with the reference to the press department of the Severodvinsk
city administration.
Bellona, 27 Jan 06
Defense Daily, 26 Jan 06
General Dynamics [GD] earlier this month said its Electric Boat subsidiary has completed its conversion of USS Ohio (SSGN-726), the first of four Trident submarines to be reconfigured as SSGN multi-mission vessels optimized for covert tactical strike and special operations support.
Ohio's conversion, undertaken in conjunction with the ship's midlife refueling, provides the Navy with its first truly transformational platform, GD said.
Ohio will be joined by three additional Tridents undergoing conversion to SSGNs--USS Michigan at Puget Sound, and USS Florida and USS Georgia at Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Virginia.
The conversions are being performed under a $1.4 billion contract awarded to Electric Boat in 2002; work is scheduled for completion in 2007.
Each SSGN will carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and support up to 66 Special Operations Forces for an extended time.
SSGNs will also serve as platforms to develop and test new weapons systems, sensors and operational concepts that could further transform naval warfare, the company said. These payloads will include large unmanned undersea vehicles and off-board sensors.
By Geoff Fein, Defense Daily, 26 Jan 06
The United States is going to need to retain nuclear weapons along with the capability to sustain and modernize them if necessary, according to the administrator of the Department of Energy's (DoE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
"I don't believe I will live to see the political conditions for abolition and I don't believe that if I live to see the political conditions, that abolition will be technically verifiable in my life time," Amb. Linton Brooks told attendees at a panel discussion on the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile yesterday in Washington, D.C.
"I am assuming that the real issue that faces the U.S. is not whether we have nuclear weapons, but what kind and for what purpose and under what conditions," he said.
One particular issue, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, has failed to curry favor on the Hill for deciding whether a future president could have a niche capability if he or she wanted it, Brooks said.
"The appropriations bill has taken the position that 'we are so sure we don't want that that we shouldn't find out whether or not we do,'" he said.
The discussion was sponsored by the Arms Control Association.
Brooks said the administration is working to reduce the total U.S. stockpile so that by 2012 it will fall to almost half the level it was in 2001 and at the lowest level since the Eisenhower administration.
While those are significant accomplishments, Brooks said further reductions are possible and desirable.
The key to making those reductions is found in the administration's nuclear posture review of 2002, he added.
"It said other capabilities could substitute for functions traditionally assigned to nuclear forces," Brooks explained. "It postulated a new triad of offensive force; nuclear, kinetic and conventional, and defensive forces in supporting [research and development] and infrastructure."
From the stand-point of DoE, the recognition of the critical role of infrastructure as an element of overall deterrence was the most fundamental and important change and it's the one that holds out the promise of additional reduction in the stockpile, Brooks added.
Still, there will be a large number of deployed weapons retained under the plan, he said.
Those weapons will be retained as a hedge against technical problems that could arise, such as warheads that don't work. The United States will need enough warheads to compensate for that possibility, Brooks said.
Additionally, the United States will maintain deployed weapons to hedge against geopolitical events, in case another country decides to start a "strategic competition, an arms race," Brooks said.
We could eliminate much of this non-deployed hedge if we had a responsive infrastructure, he added.
For example, once the United States can demonstrate it can produce warheads on a time scale that geopolitical threats occur, then it wouldn't need to retain additional warheads to hedge against international changes, Brooks said.
"Once we can respond in a timely way to technical problems in the stockpile, we may no longer need to retain extra warheads as a hedge against such problems," he added.
Another effort is the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Brooks said the RRW concept relaxes Cold War design constraints. During the Cold War, he continued, the design world believed it needed the greatest yield for smallest weight.
It wanted to put a lot of warheads on a missile and believed plutonium was scarce and a precious resource.
"Neither makes sense in today's world," Brooks said.
"If we can take advantage of this practical change and relax design constraints, we could redesign existing warheads with replacement components that are easier to manufacture, safer and more secure, eliminate environmentally dangerous materials, and increase design margins which would have the ancillary advantage of reducing the chance we'd probably never have to resume nuclear testing," he said.
In response to a question from an attendee, Brooks said research that DoE is doing on RRW is focused initially on ballistic missile warheads and specifically for use on submarine launched ballistic missile warheads.
DoE hasn't looked at RRW for tactical weapons, or bombs, as he called them.
"Some of the ideas for RRW--you can accept more weight and more volume--may not be as true for bombs because you have some other constraints," he said. "I don't think we know yet the degree to which these concepts will fly well to gravity bombs."
Brooks said the hope is to be able to take some nuclear weapon life extension programs and feed them into the RRW concept.
He added that now is the time to decide on whether to pursue RRW.
"The DoE does many things well, but making major changes in its infrastructure takes us a very long time. So the answer, when we should start on this, is now, even if we don't need it for another 15 or 20 years. Because you won't be able to get it for another 15 or 20 years," Brooks added.
He added that Congress isn't engaged enough on this issue.
None of the efforts that DoE is pursuing should be construed as a repudiation of the stockpile stewardship program, Brooks added.
"It is working. We are absolutely convinced that today's stockpile is safe and reliable. We are convinced there is no requirement now for nuclear tests."
Brooks took issue with critics who claim that U.S. research and development on weapons programs hampers the ability to advance global non-proliferation.
The major objective of non-proliferation is to keep rogue states and terrorist groups from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), he said.
"Our efforts to sustain and modernize the U.S. nuclear forces don't increase terrorists' incentives to get those weapons, and it doesn't have much impact on rogue states [either]," Brooks said.
The last decade has seen reductions in Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons, alert levels and deployment, suspension in testing by the five nuclear weapons states, and no new warheads deployed. Brooks said there is no evidence that any of those efforts have had slightest impact on North Korea or Iran in their programs to acquire nuclear capabilities.
“Seems they are seeking such weapons to deter the U.S. from coming to the aid of friends and allies, and if anything they are responding to our overwhelming superiority and not what we may or not be doing in area of nuclear weapons,” Brooks said.
But the United States should be concerned, as it goes forward, on how its actions can affect international support among friends, allies, and partners on whom the United States depends on to strengthen non-proliferation commitments, he said.
Report: Guam sailor killed in traffic crash
Stars and
Stripes Pacific edition, 29 Jan 06
A 20-year-old U.S. sailor died early Friday in a traffic accident on Guam, the Pacific Daily News reported.
Navy officials and Guam police officials could not be reached for comment by deadline on Friday.
The Daily News quoted police as saying the sailor lost control of his car on Marine Corps Drive near Polaris Point in Piti, near Apra Harbor.
Police said the man, who was not identified, was stationed on the submarine USS City of Corpus Christi.
The paper reported the incident was the island’s first traffic casualty this year.
Navy focusing training on detecting China's advanced diesel subs
Audrey McAvoy, Associated Press (Cleveland Plain Dealer), 29 Jan 06
Aboard the USS Ronald Reagan - Two Navy destroyers and a cruiser dangle sonar devices into the ocean to listen for enemy submarines lurking 50 miles from Honolulu. Naval aviators in P-3 surveillance planes and helicopters drop sonar buoys into the sea to give the sailors more ears below the surface.
The submarines are not really enemy vessels at all, but U.S. subs participating in anti-submarine warfare training.
The exercises, held Jan. 9-12, are something Navy sailors will be doing more of in coming years. The Pacific Fleet has made training to track and destroy submarines its top combat priority amid concerns its sailors' skills have not kept up with the advanced diesel submarines China and other Pacific Rim countries have been buying.
"There is a real threat out there - over 140 diesel submarines in the Pacific, and the technology on them is getting better every day," said Capt. David Steindl, who directed the ships and aircraft during the exercises. "We need to train constantly to be ready if we ever have to face that threat."
Tracking submarines dropped on the Navy's list of priorities after the Cold War ended and the former Soviet Union began retiring some of its undersea vessels. Also, diesel submarines were considered too loud to pose much of a threat to the U.S. Navy and its silent-running nuclear subs.
But the emergence of quieter diesel subs has given anti-submarine warfare new urgency. These diesel submarines are no challenge to the U.S. Navy's supremacy at sea; they can't go fast enough for long enough distances for that. But they are qui eter and thus harder to find and more capable of sneaking up on ships.
Owen Cote, associate director of the security studies program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said the United States is primarily concerned that China might use its diesel subs to block commercial ship access to Taiwan and force Taiwan to capitulate in a military showdown with Beijing.
Cote said the Navy also might have some concerns about North Korean submarines, as well as Iranian submarines in the Persian Gulf. But those vessels are not considered to be as advanced as those the Chinese have.
Steindl, commander of Destroyer Squadron Seven since April, said he has been spending twice as much time on anti-submarine warfare exercises as he did the last time he served at sea, four years ago. Now, he said, his team is training almost constantly for anti-submarine warfare.
Starting last summer, sailors aboard the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan spent months off San Diego matching their wits against the Gotland, a Swedish vessel that is among the world's quietest and hardest to detect diesel submarines.
The Gotland uses advanced technology to muffle its sound. It also can stay under water for weeks at a time. Most diesel subs have to surface every day to recharge their batteries, making them vulnerable to attack.
Steindl said his sailors found ways to track the Gotland during their exercises, though he declined to say how. He said the training prepared his crew well.
"If we can go against her, we can go against anyone," he said.
Other Navy ships will get to train against the Gotland until June, when the Swedish sub is due to go home.
Joe Buff, Military.com, 27 Jan 06
Everybody knows that the next Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will be released to the public in another few days. Already portions of that document have “leaked,” and been discussed avidly in the media. The official QDR seems to hold some real surprises, both pleasant and unpleasant, for different branches of the armed forces and different major weapons acquisition programs. The full document is bound to be controversial. But a controversy of a different sort is being brewed up right now by what Defense Today for 25 January described as a “Democratic-oriented think tank,” the Center for American Progress (CAP), and their “alternative QDR,” formally titled “Restoring American Military Power: A Progressive Quadrennial Defense Review.” (CAP's full document can be viewed through their website, www.americanprogress.org <http://www.americanprogress.org/>.)
CAP describes themselves as non-partisan, and indeed they might be (despite Defense Today 's labeling), but to me personally the Foreword of their Alternative QDR has a distinctly political “Bash Bush” tone -- while the rest of the document badly underplays the emerging/resurging strategic threats posed by the People's Republic of China, Putin's autocratic New Russia, and the arms-dealing partnership between those two near-superpower countries. CAP says the purpose of the Alternative QDR is to “provoke debate.” But there's a big difference between honest debate over genuine differences of opinion, and catastrophic failure of good old-fashioned fact checking. I carefully read the Alternative QDR's section on the Virginia-class submarine (on page 53 of the PDF version). I was floored. They recommend immediately cancelling the entire program. What's even worse is not this suggestion per se, but the utterly grotesque errors and misunderstandings used to back it up. Here are a few selected quotes:
“The Virginia-class submarine was originally intended to combat the next generation of Russian submarines, vessels that will never be built.”
“The Navy < http://www.military.com/Community/Home/1,14700,NAVY,00.html > plans to retire the existing Los Angeles-class submarines early -- that is, before their normal service life is reached.”
“The Virginia-class submarine . . . fails to provide significant new capabilities beyond those of the Los Angeles-class.”
First of all, folks, CAP seems to have mixed up the Virginia-class (up to 30 are planned) with the previous, truncated Seawolf-class (3 were built) -- which is a pretty egregious boo-boo to make in any purported QDR, alternative or otherwise. The Seawolfs were conceived at the height of the Cold War, to maintain undersea superiority against the Kremlin's submarine fleet. The Virginias were conceived of, designed, and entered construction entirely in a post-Cold War environment. They are specifically optimized for littoral warfare -- in shallow waters or near shore.
Secondly, while true that the Navy has retired some Los Angeles subs when they might instead have refueled their spent reactor cores, this was done to save money, something that CAP itself aggressively advocates. A bit of a self-contradiction here, what? Yet this isn't even the really operative point. Elsewhere in the Alternative QDR, CAP's thinkers plainly state that aircraft carriers don't last forever (they wear out from the stresses of use after about 30 years.) Yet implicit in their muddlement over Los Angeles versus Virginia is that subs do somehow have an eternal hull life. This simply isn't so. Fast-attack submarines, subjected to their own unique stresses of use (diving to great depths and surfacing, repeatedly), also have a useful hull life of about 30 years. Of the 60+ Los Angeles-class vessels ever built, most entered service before 1990. This means that after 2020, only some 18 could remain safely in commission, and by 2026 even those will need to be scrapped. We desperately need more Virginias to replace them.
Thirdly, to claim that the Virginia-class subs fail to provide significant new capabilities beyond the Los Angeles subs is stupefyingly misinformed. The amazing advances of the Virginia-class have been discussed amply elsewhere. What were CAP's think-tankers thinking? At the risk of redundancy with other items in the open literature on undersea warfare, but in the interests of clarity, consider just a few things:
The Los Angeles subs were originally designed for deep sea, open-ocean contests against Soviet subs and surface units. Their manuvering in very shallow water is labor-intensive and rather non optimal; at speeds below 5 knots, reportedly, they're barely manageable platforms. The Virginia-class in contrast has computer-controlled autopilot and pinpoint hovering capabilities, allowing it to operate rock steady at dead-slow speeds. Virginias can do this for prolonged periods in very shallow, in-shore waters, where many submarine missions are now taking place.
The Virginia-class has literally twice the payload capacity for Tactical Tomahawk missiles and/or Improved ADCAP Mark 48 heavyweight torpedoes, compared to the Los Angeles subs. An Advanced Sail in the R&D stage now for use on further Virginias beyond the ten that are currently funded would carry and deploy even more (and very large) weapons.
Speaking of weapons, the Virginia class torpedo tubes are significantly wider, 26.5 inches compared to 21 inches on the Los Angeles-class. This allows deployment of sophisticated unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) which just won't fit through a Los Angeles tube. The wider Virginia tubes can also accommodate big next-generation weapons and off-board probes -- including, conceivably, submarine launched unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).
The Virginia-class has an innovative 9-man lock-out diver trunk, permitting very rapid deployment of Navy SEALs or other commandos. The Los Angeles lock-out trunks don't even come close to this capacity. The Virginias thus tremendously expand the envelope of possible special ops force mission profiles compared to Los Angeles subs.
The Virginia-class has an entirely new control room layout, enabling captain and crew situational awareness lightyears ahead of what's possible aboard the obsolescing Los Angeles ships. Ideal situational awareness is especially vital in any congested, fast-paced, target-rich and threat-rich battlespace -- whether deterrence or outright combat is the order of the day.
Any submarine's ultimate and most essential weapon is its stealth, its undetectability when working in the face of the enemy. Here too the Virginia class is a generation ahead of the remaining Los Angeles boats, especially in repressing “non-acoustic” signatures (optical, chemical, radar, magnetic, wake anomaly, etc.) which have become so important in anti-submarine warfare in the littorals. But quieting on passive sonar still matters, lots: It has been stated publicly, by a retired submarine captain turned military contractor who was there, that in a recent exercise between USS Virginia and an Ohio-class Trident missile “boomer” sub, it was Virginia , not the Trident ship, that proved to be the invisible “hole in the ocean.”
I could go on and on, but I think I've made my point.
AUDIT FINDS ‘MAJOR’ PROBLEMS IN SHIPYARDS’ EARNED
Christopher J. Castelli, Inside the Navy, 30 Jan 06
An internal naval audit found “major operational deficiencies” in the earned value management systems used by shipbuilders General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman on the Arleigh Burke destroyer program, raising the possibility that other major shipbuilding programs could be affected too.
The Naval Audit Service completed the review Aug. 30, 2005, but the findings were never announced, nor was the report released publicly. Inside the Navy obtained a redacted version of the report through the Freedom of Information Act. Naval Sea Systems Command, which oversees the service’s shipbuilding programs, officially concurred with the audit and agreed to implement its recommendations.
Earned value management is one of the main methods contractors and government program managers use to track the performance of contractors working on major acquisition programs. The progress of the contractors is supposed to be measured against cost, schedule and technical goals.
But auditors found that General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works shipyard in Maine and Northrop Grumman’s Ship Systems sector on the Gulf Coast -- the two shipbuilders that make Arleigh Burke destroyers -- each failed to comply with the majority of the Pentagon’s 32 guidelines for earned value management. Bath failed to comply with 21 of the guidelines and Northrop failed to comply with 22, auditors found. Navy officials who supervised shipbuilding at the privately owned yards did not provide adequate oversight for earned value management, according to the report. The Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 destroyer program did not effectively use earned value management, auditors concluded.
Auditors found both shipbuilders had major operational deficiencies, meaning the contractors were not complying with guidelines that cover organization; planning, scheduling and budgeting; accounting; analysis and management; revision and data maintenance.
The report also raises the possibility that Northrop’s problems with earned value management “may have adversely impacted the quality of decisions made and information received” for other major Navy acquisition programs at the company’s Gulf Coast shipbuilding sector. The Zumwalt-class DD(X) destroyer, the San Antonio-class LPD-17 amphibious ship and the Wasp-class LHD amphibious assault ship are the other high-profile Navy shipbuilding programs at the sector. Whether such programs were affected can only be sorted out once the Defense Contract Management Agency completes a review, auditors concluded.
NAVSEA agreed to have the Defense Contract Management Agency review both shipbuilders, but spokeswoman Katie Dunnigan declined to say if the command is concerned that other Northrop shipbuilding programs might be hurt. The Navy’s program executive office for ships has used earned value management data provided by the shipbuilders to deliver 49 Arleigh Burke destroyers on or ahead of schedule and within budget, she noted.
“PEO Ships, NAVSEA and the shipbuilders are actively addressing any operational deficiencies and are implementing the required corrective actions in response to the Naval Audit Service recommendations,” Dunnigan said. She refused to say if any of the recommendations had been implemented yet.
According to the report, the Defense Contract Management Agency is not scheduled to start a compliance review of the Northrop shipbuilding sector for months, meaning it is not yet clear whether other programs were hurt by the problems auditors identified. But Northrop spokesman Brian Cullin did not hesitate to dismiss the possibility.
“The DDG earned value issues identified in this report have not had a negative impact on the DD(X), LPD-17 or LHD,” he said. “To the contrary, the earned value reporting system has been very useful in managing all of our programs and identifying the areas of potential impact and allow us to identify solutions.”
Spokesmen for both defense contractors downplayed the audit, noting that NAVSEA certified the shipyards were compliant with the 32 guidelines in recent years.
Cullin said the company agrees that the earned value management practices require continuous improvement for the Arleigh Burke program. But, he added, for each deficiency identified in the report, the sector has “a documented practice that is compliant” with the germane guideline. Northrop’s Gulf Coast sector has “a compliant system including supporting tools, policies and procedures that are in place at the sector for complete and continuous implementation of the program,” he said.
The Arleigh Burke program is a “very successful and stable” program, Cullin said, noting Northrop has delivered 23 ships to date and has five ships in process. The baselines are “well established” and Northrop has demonstrated “consistent and predictable cost performance” over the life of the program with 18 of the 23 [Northrop-built] ships delivered on or before schedule, with the last 16 averaging delivery dates eight weeks early, he said. Cost performance has been “equally predictable” with most ships completed within 2 percent of the cost objectives, he said.
Kendell Pease, a spokesman for General Dynamics, said Bath was “not at all” concerned by the report, noting the shipyard “has addressed the items raised in the audit.” Bath asserts it is now fully compliant with the 32 guidelines. The report, however, indicates Bath did not dispute most of the findings when the audit was conducted. Of the 21 guidelines Bath was said to be violating, the shipbuilder disputed only five cases, the report states.
The items identified in the audit “are important but . . . they weren’t show-stoppers that would stop us from providing accurate and timely information for program decision-makers,” Pease said.
He noted the Navy’s DDG award fee board findings from last May and November for the “management systems and information evaluation factor” reflected positive ratings for both periods: an adjective of “outstanding,” a score of 99 percent and a trend evaluation rating of “consistent.”
“These evaluations clearly indicate that our Navy customer is satisfied with the performance” of Bath’s management control systems, he said. But as part of the shipyard’s “continued commitment” to improve its earned value management, Bath addressed the items raised in the audit, he indicated.
The Navy’s plans for implementing the audit’s six recommendations are spelled out in the report.
The first recommendation urged the NAVSEA officials supervising shipbuilding at the shipyards to have their respective contractors develop a plan of actions and milestones to address all earned value management problems. The report said both shipbuilders were scheduled to submit such a plan to the Navy by Aug. 31, 2005, the day after the audit was published inside the Navy Department. Northrop’s corrective actions were slated to be completed by April 30, 2006, according to the report. Bath, meanwhile, had already started taking corrective actions and would wrap up by Nov. 30, 2005, according to the report.
The second recommendation called for the NAVSEA shipbuilding supervisors to review, approve and monitor the two contractors’ plans. NAVSEA told auditors this would be done by Sept. 30, 2005. In addition, NAVSEA agreed to submit a request to the Defense Contract Management Agency by May 30, 2006, to perform an earned value management review.
Third, the report recommended having the Defense Contract Management Agency validate the contractors’ compliance with DOD guidelines at the completion of corrective actions for all earned value management problems. NAVSEA agreed, noting the time frame depends on when the first two recommendations are completed. The target dates indicate the agency would be contacted by Jan. 31 to review Bath and contacted by May 30 to review Northrop.
Fourth, the audit recommended establishing controls to ensure all program management offices conduct integrated baseline reviews as required. NAVSEA agreed to do this by Aug. 31, 2005, the day after the audit was published.
Fifth, the report called on NAVSEA headquarters to improve oversight over the command’s field offices that supervise work at shipyards to improve “surveillance” of earned value management. The command agreed to do so by Nov. 1, 2005. In addition, NAVSEA’s inspector general plans to review the oversight provided by field offices during command performance inspections by March 31, according to the report.
Finally, the audit recommended coordinating with the Defense Acquisition University and the Pentagon’s earned value management working group to provide additional training to all personnel monitoring contractor activity. NAVSEA agreed to explore these options, with a target completion date of March 31.
Neither the Defense Contract Management Agency nor NAVSEA headquarters provided adequate oversight, auditors concluded. Consequently, monitoring earned value management was left to individual field offices with little or no assurance that proper oversight was being provided, according to the report. The audit also raises questions about why NAVSEA was certifying industry’s plans, given the Defense Contract Management Agency has the lead on overseeing earned value management for defense programs and the responsibility for reviewing earned value management plans and verifying initial and continuing contractor compliance with DOD’s 32 guidelines. Auditors concluded NAVSEA’s actions contradicted Federal Acquisition Regulations, but last week the organizations involved disagreed.
NAVSEA’s Dunnigan asserted the Defense Contract Management Agency “does not have responsibility” for earned value management under contracts administered by the Navy’s shipbuilding supervisors. The supervisors administer shipbuilding contracts under NAVSEA’s authority, she said via e-mail.
“Therefore, NAVSEA, in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 5105.64, DFARS clause 252.242-7002 (previously 252.234-7001) that is invoked on DDG-51 contracts, and sections of the Earned Value Management Implementation Guide, is authorized to execute Advance Agreements that recognize acceptance of the contractor’s EVMS,” she said.
Defense Contract Management Agency spokesman Thomas Gelli said his agency concurs with Dunnigan’s statement.
“DCMA is always willing to assist defense activities, including NAVSEA, with their earned value management responsibilities,” Gelli said. “But it does so only if asked.”
Gelli said agency officials are “standing by and fully expecting to be enlisted” in performing the reviews that the audit recommends.
He also noted the agency is involved with earned-value management responsibilities at Northrop’s shipyard in Newport News, VA. That facility builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. The agency’s involvement there is not program specific, he said. The agency is working with disparate aspects of the shipyard’s overall management operation, such as the accounting system and supplier system, he said. The letter from the Navy shipbuilding conversion and repair office requesting the agency’s help with earned value management at Newport News was dated July 11, 2005, he said.
Goal of 313 ships not cited in draft
DRAFT QDR, RUMSFELD EMPHASIZE FLEET’S CAPABILITIES OVER NUMBERS
By Chris Johnson, Inside the Navy, 30 Jan 06
While a draft version of the Pentagon’s new Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes joint maritime capabilities, the document stops short of embracing the 313-ship fleet future force projection included in the Navy’s long-term vessel construction plan.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Mullen’s latest long-term shipbuilding plan maintains the size of the fleet will grow from 281 ships to 313 ships in the coming years, but the draft QDR does not set such a specific goal for the total fleet size.
The QDR lists numerical requirements for some aspects of the fleet -- such as establishing 11 carrier strike groups and procuring the first eight ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force Future squadron -- but the report generally places more emphasis on capabilities.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld similarly emphasized capabilities -- rather than the number of ships -- when he discussed the future of the Navy at a Jan. 25 press briefing.
“What people should talk about is not how many ships, but how many ships are deployed -- how many ships actually are giving you capability out there,” he said. “The deployable days are not any different today with a Navy of just under 300 ships than they were when the Navy was 400 or 500 because we’ve increased their deployable days.”
Rumsfeld argued that ship capabilities have increased substantially since he came to the Defense Department. In 2001, three of four ships were not deployable at a given moment because of long repair and maintenance cycles, but now the number of deployable days per ship has nearly doubled, he said. Rumsfeld added that the percentage of the fleet routinely at sea has increased by more than 50 percent and an additional third of the fleet is ready to surge.
“In short, the United States Navy is vastly more capable, more lethal and more agile today,” he said.
The draft QDR makes a similar case for improved naval capabilities, noting that the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan “modified the Navy’s tiered readiness posture to increase the amount of time a ship or other naval unit is fully ready to deploy.” Additionally, the FRP has enabled six of the Navy’s 11 carrier strike groups to deploy immediately and has allowed two more to deploy within 90 days, states the draft. The QDR also notes that rotational crewing “has further increased the operational availability of forces by up to 33 percent.”
But when a reporter asked Rumsfeld whether he was suggesting that Mullen’s plan for a larger fleet was unnecessary, the secretary said he agreed with the CNO.
A Congressional Research Service report updated Jan. 25 notes that Rumsfeld refused to endorse the Navy’s previous 375-ship proposal in February 2003, creating ambiguity about the number of ships needed.
The report speculates this ambiguity may be convenient for the Navy because it provides more time to resolve uncertainties with new technology and Sea Swap. Additionally, the uncertainty allows DOD officials to discuss ship-acquisition programs without worrying about quantitative details, according to the report. CRS states that officials could be held accountable for these details later or might disappoint members of Congress or industry.
While failing to provide a set number for the total fleet may be useful for DOD officials, the CRS report also notes uncertainty has caused many problems.
“This ambiguity, together with year-to-year volatility in the composition of the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, created difficulties for Congress in conducting oversight of Navy budgets and programs, and for industry in making rational business-planning decisions,” the report states.
CRS speculates that these problems will continue unless the ambiguity is addressed.
“If the Navy’s 313-ship proposal is not explicitly endorsed by OSD as an official DOD planning goal, it could lead to a continuation of, rather than an end to, the recent uncertainty in Navy ship force-structure planning,” states the report.
Also during the Jan. 25 press conference, Rumsfeld refused to make any comment on whether a greater threat from China is influencing the QDR’s recommendation to reposition forces in the Pacific.
“The fleet will have greater presence in the Pacific Ocean, consistent with the global shift of trade and transport,” states the draft. “Accordingly, the Navy plans to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available carriers and 60 percent of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence.”
Congressional researcher Ronald O’Rourke said he thought the repositioning was an effort to possibly contain China’s growing military forces.
“This shift likely reflects Navy and DOD concern about meeting a potential challenge in coming years from improved Chinese maritime military forces,” he said. “The proposed actions are consistent with what you might want to do to better position the Navy to meet operational challenges in the Western Pacific, including the Taiwan Strait.”
New Pier Is
Good News For Submarine Base And The Region
$31 million
structure to better serve Navy's newer attack vessels
By Anthony Cronin, New London Day, 29 Jan 06
The U.S. Navy has allocated nearly $31 million to construct a new pier at the Naval Submarine Base in Groton that will offer today's attack submarines a state-of-the-art facility offering more services and conveniences than the base's older piers.
Navy officials said the American Bridge Co. of Richmond, Va., was awarded a $30.6 million contract to replace Pier 6 at the base. The work includes the demolition and disposal of several piers to accommodate the new, wider pier. The entire project is expected to be completed by December of next year.
The work is good news for the sub base, which will get a modern pier to accommodate its longer attack submarines homeported at the base. But it is also good news for the region, which has seen the spigot on military construction work open much wider since the submarine base was spared a shutdown as part of this summer's nationwide base closings and consolidation process.
The Pentagon in May announced the Groton base would be on the list of closed facilities, but an independent federal review panel overturned the decision in late August, keeping the 687-acre base open.
This past November, the Navy broke ground on a new $17 million submarine escape trainer and anticipates that the high-tech training facility will be ready in the summer of 2008 to train submariners.
In August, following the successful fight to keep the base open, the Navy released about $54 million to restart critical construction projects at the base, including the trainer, the new pier and other projects.
Officials said at that time that the Commander for Naval Installations gave the go-ahead for construction of the new $30 million pier, the $17 million escape trainer and about $5 million in various security improvements at the two entrances to the base on Crystal Lake Road and $4 million for a weapons-storage area.
Senior Chief Steve Strickland, a spokesman for the base, said work would begin in the spring for the new Pier 6. Construction plans call for the demolition of the current Pier 6, as well as the adjacent Pier 4, to make room for the new, larger pier.
Strickland said the new pier would be about 500 feet in length and about 65 feet wide, both longer and wider than existing piers at the base.
The pier is designed to accommodate Los Angeles-class submarines as well as the newest generation of nuclear attack submarines, the Virginia class.
“The main thing about it is simply its size,” said Strickland. Among the new pier features will be a rubber-faced steel fendering system allowing the subs to dock at the pier without damage. In addition, the new pier will feature various built-in utilities, including pure-water piping, ending the need for large water trucks to supply the subs. The pier will also allow computer-related hookups from the submarine.
Strickland said the pier work is part of a longer-term plan to modernize the 13 piers at the submarine base to accommodate the newer submarines and their more sophisticated requirements.
A former official at a key maker of submarine valves is sent to prison for his role in the fraud.
A former high-ranking official at a supplier of valves for nuclear-powered Navy submarines has been sentenced to two years in prison for falsifying quality-control documents about the valves'
By peter Djardin, Daily Press, 28 Jan 06
Larry Kelly, once the vice president at Hunt Valve, of Salem, Ohio, was also
ordered to three additional years of supervised release and ordered to pay $4.2
million, the Justice Department said.
Kelly, 52, who now lives in Arlington, Tenn., had pleaded guilty in April as
part of an agreement with the government: He admitted to one count of conspiring
to defraud the government and obtaining money illegally by providing false
certifications on the valves.
Hunt Valve has supplied thousands of critical valves over the years for
submarines built at Northrop Grumman Newport News, including Los Angeles-class
and Virginia-class submarines. It also supplies some valves for aircraft
carriers.
The charge against Kelly pertained to a wide-ranging fraud conspiracy. One
accuses him of participating in a scheme in which Hunt workers scanned documents
into a computer and altered them - to make it look as if steel components were
heat-tested even though they never were.
"The falsified certificate was printed out and inserted into Hunt Valve's
certification package for that valve, which was delivered to the Navy," a grand
jury indictment had said.
A press release issued by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District
of Ohio adds that on some tests some of the fraudulent certificates were "faxed
from one fax machine to another in the same building to make the document appear
fuzzy in an attempt to conceal the falsification."
Kelly did not return a phone call seeking comment.
In a plea agreement, Kelly agreed to cooperate in the continuing case in
exchange for a recommendation for a lesser sentence, said Richard H. Blake, the
U.S. Attorney handing the case.
"Had he gone to trial and been convicted, he would have likely faced four to
five years under the (sentencing) guidelines," Blake said. "Kelly has agreed to
cooperate with the government's ongoing investigation and will testify if need
be."
Blake said the Justice Department's case is continuing to build against other
officials.
In another plea agreement in June, Wayne Aldrich, a former quality assurance
manager at Hunt Valve, was sentenced to 33 months in prison.
Like Kelly, he was also ordered to pay $4.2 million, the cost of the
government's investigation into the case.
Though Kelly and Aldrich will likely never pay close to those amounts, they will
likely have to pay at least 10 percent of their income to the government for
many years. The criminal investigation began in early 2001, when a whistleblower
complained about practices at Hunt, and a government investigation ensued.
The case is related to a separate civil lawsuit that was brought against Hunt
Valve, General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Newport News, among
others.
Electric Boat, Newport News shipyard and the other defendants agreed in October
to a $13.2 million settlement of a lawsuit brought by the whistleblower, brought
under the False Claims Act.
The suit had accused the two shipyards of failing in their duty to uncover - and
stop - obvious quality and fraud problems at Hunt. Under the terms of the deal,
Electric Boat paid $7.7 million and forgave $630,000 in expected bills to the
government. The Newport News shipyard paid $3 million and gave up on $1.2
million it once planned to charge the government for work investigating
complaints into the valves.
Sub commander fighting to clear name
By Jeff
Schogol, Star and Stripes Mideast Edition, 29 Jan 06
A Navy officer faulted in the collision of a U.S. submarine and a South Korean fishing vessel in 1998 has won the right to take his fight to clear his name back to federal court.
The U.S. Court of Appeals on Friday said a federal judge could not prevent Cmdr. Charles H. Piersall III from trying to void a nonjudicial punishment against him, according to court records.
In February 1998, Piersall - then a lieutenant commander - was executive officer and command duty officer aboard the USS La Jolla during the collision. The 27-ton fishing trawler sank. All five crewmen were rescued.
In a subsequent proceeding known as a “mast,” the commander of Submarine Group 7 found that Piersall had been “derelict in his duties” in failing to prevent the collision.
Piersall was issued a letter of reprimand, which he appealed unsuccessfully.
He then went to the Board of Correction for Naval Records, claiming that he had the right to reject the mast’s findings because the proceedings were held on dry land, not aboard the USS La Jolla, said Eugene Fidell, a military law expert who represented Piersall.
When the correction board rejected Piersall’s claim, he pursued the matter in federal court.
But the judge tossed the suit. The Navy secretary had argued that Piersall lost the right to pursue the matter in federal court when he failed to request a court-martial before the mast, records say.
The Navy secretary also claimed that civilian courts are prohibited from interfering with the military justice system, but the U.S. Court of Appeals found otherwise and overturned the district court’s ruling.
A spokesman for the U.S. attorney’s office, which represents the government in this case, declined to comment on the ruling Friday because the case is still pending.
Fidell said that the case will go back to federal district court to be heard by the same judge, Royce C. Lambeth. No date is set.
Fidell called the appellate court’s ruling an important victory for U.S. servicemembers because it allows them to fight correction boards’ decisions in federal court.
“For some people,” he said, “it makes the difference between a successful career and an unsuccessful career.”
Future Of Submarines And Electric Boat
New London Day, 29 Jan 06
Submarine building continues to be a cornerstone of southeastern Connecticut's economy and an important part of its culture. But its future of the submarine itself as a part of the nation's arsenal is in peril, and with it, the destiny of Electric Boat.
The industry is threatened by the steady decline in size of the American naval fleet since the end of the Cold War. Where there once had been a steady supply of new submarines flowing out of the shipyard, production has declined to one sub a year, each built jointly by EB and Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia. On top of this problem for Electric Boat, the Navy has resumed awarding most of its submarine maintenance work to government-owned naval shipyards.
In one of its 2006 forums, The Day will examine the implications of this trend on the future of submarine building, on Electric Boat's chances for survival and on the nation's naval industrial base, which consists of the myriad of contractors that support EB in building submarines.
The forum and a special Perspective section also will look at the debate taking place in the Pentagon over the nation's need for submarines and its potential outcome.
News & Observer, 28 Jan 06
Your Jan. 12 editorial "Danger sounds" said it would make sense to limit the use of mid-frequency sonar, which the Navy would like to deploy off North Carolina, to a single area where whales and fish could be closely monitored.
Such an illogical decision to stop nearly all current mid-frequency sonar use because of suspected problems with low-frequency sonar would handcuff our Navy ships. These ships use mid-frequency sonar in all oceans, as the best technology to detect today's submarines. I have seen dolphins race from a distance to a ship using sonar, then swim along near the bow.
The proposed sonar range consists of listening devices on the seabed; only the ship in training would use sonar. We can find the best location for a range to train our ship crews, while detecting and avoiding marine mammals.
Germany has completed two Type 212 subs, quieter and harder to detect than any previous ones. They are for export, and China is building similar ones.
Within 20 years after World War I, Americans forgot about the submarine threat. In winter 1942, German submarines sank over 70 ships just off the North Carolina coast, killed hundreds of sailors and nearly brought our Atlantic war effort to a halt.
Should America pretend that there is no threat, and bury our heads in the sand once again? There are countries that want to be able to use subs to spy along our coasts, sink our aircraft carriers and incinerate our cities.
Bill Brogdon
Capt., U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)
Cape Carteret
Safecracker reveals old sub's secrets
By Ana M. Alaya, Newark Star Ledger, 29 Jan 06
Using his bare hands and his wits, a professional safecracker opened five safes on a World War II submarine in Bergen County yesterday to reveal the secrets they have been hiding for six decades.
In the end, there was nothing that would be considered top secret today in the safes discovered on the USS Ling 297. But the old manuals, blueprints, pennies, bullets, keys, carbon paper and two quarts of cleaning alcohol were valuable to veterans and officials of the New Jersey Naval Museum, where the submarine has been berthed on the Hackensack River since 1973.
"I'm very happy with what we found today. There's a lot of history there," said Mike Ococella, a board member of the Submarine Memorial Association, which operates the museum.
The association asked world-champion safecracker Jeff Sitar of Clifton to unlock the safes, which had not been opened for at least 60 years. They tapped him because he specializes in opening combination locks without drills or explosives, using a method called "manipulation," relying on his nimble fingers, ears, and wits.
Yesterday, the 43-year-old safecracker's hands shook, and he admitted he was nervous as he descended into the 312-foot Balao-Class World War II sub. But he also was excited.
"I love a challenge," said Sitar, who has professionally cracked vaults and safes in mansions, museums, banks and battleships for 30 years. "Each lock and safe has its own personality," he said.
Cramped at times in the suffocating quarters of the submarine, Sitar calmly and deftly spun each Yale combination lock back and forth, over and over, listening carefully to the clicking tumblers.
Sitar used an amplifier on one safe and a prototype sound device to filter out noise on another. Each lock had a possible 1 million combinations. He opened the locks speedily -- 3:56 for the safe in the executive officer's quarters; 7:15 for the safe in the captain's quarters; 13:32 for the yeoman's room safe; 16:46 for a hall safe; and 4:21 for the radio shack safe.
Basil E. Kio, the state commander of the United States Submarine Veterans of World War II, said the manuals in the first officer's and the yeoman's rooms, covering everything from pumps to electronics, were at one time considered classified.
Ococella said the manuals were "worth their weight in gold" in terms of historical preservation of the Ling. They will be displayed, along with the other items found yesterday, at the museum at 78 River St. in Hackensack.
Launched in 1943, the USS Ling served a single patrol in the Atlantic. It was in the Panama Canal en route to the Pacific when Japan surrendered. After 15 years in storage, followed by 11 years as a Naval Reserve training vessel, it was donated to the museum.
The most surprising find to Kio was the cleaning alcohol, a product normally stored in the main quarters to clean machines. One sealed can was made in Newark. The other, a can of 190-proof alcohol, was made in New Orleans.
"That was probably somebody's private stock," said Kio, explaining officers would sometimes mix the cleaning alcohols with juice and drink the concoction -- an illegal beverage called "gilly juice."
The safe in the captain's room stored two .45-caliber bullets, a U.S. government-issued pen and 16 master keys for the interlocks on the torpedo tubes.
"You didn't want to open both doors on the torpedo tubes at the same time, or you could flood the boat," explained Thomas Coulson, who is on the museum staff.
Korea Offers To Sell Subs To Indonesia
By Lee Jin-woo, Staff Reporter, Korea Times, January 28, 2006
Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung proposed selling South Korean-built submarines to Indonesia when he met with his Indonesian counterpart in Jakarta earlier this week, a government source said on Friday.
Yoon offered to sell 1,300-ton Type 209 submarines, to be built by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME), to the Southeast Asian country during a meeting with Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono on Monday, the sourrce said.
DefenseNews, an American military news Web Site, has carried a similar report that Indonesia is mulling buying submarines from South Korea, Russia and China as part of a naval force improvement program.
Lt. Col. Lee Jae-hyung at the Defense Ministry’s public affairs office confirmed the reports, saying, ``The two ministers discussed ways of strengthening sea power between the two countries through close military cooperation.’’
Daewoo International Corp. has competed with Russian and German firms to grab the order from Indonesia, which is expected to procure two to three submarines, a Daewoo executive said.
``It’s a bit hasty to say whether we’ll win the multi-million dollar contract or not. But if we win, it’ll be recorded as one of the largest exports of military equipment in the nation’s history,’’ a spokesman of the trading firm told The Korea Times on condition of anonymity.
The official said his company held a presentation for ranking navy officers in Indonesia in May last year and some $50 million needed to carry out the program has been included in the defense budget of Indonesia for fiscal 2006.
Back in the mid-1990s, the trading firm won contracts from the Indonesian Air Force for 12 South Korean trainer aircraft, the KT-1B, worth some $54 million.
The order was part of a ``counter trading’’ project, which included some military vehicles produced by South Korea’s Kia Motors and a domestically built hospital ship, in return for taking eight CN-235 regional airline and military tactical transports from Indonesia.
The first batch of seven trainers was sent to Indonesia in 2003. Daewoo officials said eight more planes are likely to be supplied to the Southeast Asian country.
Yoon visited Indonesia on the first leg of an eight-day tour that took him to the Philippines and the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii.
While in Manila, Yoon reaffirmed South Korea’s promise to give two, secondhand Patrol Killer Medium boats to the Philippines later this year.
South Korea has already delivered 18 other naval vessels to the Philippines under a 2003 agreement.
Yoon is scheduled to meet Pacific Command chief Adm. William J. Fallon this weekend, before returning home Sunday.
Russia to build another fourth-generation submarine of new Borey-class
Sevmash plant will commemorate 100 years anniversary of the Russian submarine fleet with the laying the keel of the third strategic submarine of the new Borey-class, Interfax reported with the reference to the press department of the Severodvinsk city administration.
Bellona, 27 Jan 06
The new submarine’s name will reportedly be “Vladimir Monomach”. The Russian navy command is to take the final decision on the name. Vladimir Monomach ruled in Kiev, then the capital of the Russian state, between 1113 and 1125. He was the father of Yuri Dolgoruky, the founder of Moscow. The Russian navy previously had semi-armoured frigate "Vladimir Monomach", which perished in 1905.
The other two new Project 955 Borey-class submarines are undergoing construction to be outfitted with the new Bulava missiles, but the operational date for the first vessel was recently postponed by one year to 2007.
The keel of the first fourth-generation Project 935 strategic missile submarine Yuri Dolgoruky was laid down at the Sevmash State Nuclear Ship-Building Centre at Severodvinsk on 2 November 1996. On 19 March 2004 Sevmash laid down a second strategic missile submarine of the Project 955 Borey class. The Aleksandr Nevskiy was designed from the outset to carry a new solid-propellant Bulava missiles.