Since 08-05-07
The Geopolitics of Turkey
Since 08-05-07
From:
Lowell J Mix [mailto:ljmix@juno.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 02, 2007 11:59 PM
To: CAdams5804@aol.com; asagreenhornet@yahoo.com
Subject: Geopolitical Intelligence Report - The Geopolitics of Turkey
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GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
07.31.2007
Analyses Forecasts Geopolitical Diary Global Market Briefs Intelligence Guidance Situation Reports Weekly Intellgence Reports Terrorism Brief
By George Friedman
Rumors are floating in Washington and elsewhere that Turkey is preparing to move
against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an anti-Turkish group seeking an
independent Kurdistan in Turkey. One report, by Robert Novak in the Washington
Post, says the United States is planning to
collaborate with Turkey in suppressing the PKK in northern Iraq, an area the
PKK has used as a safe-haven and launch pad to carry out attacks in Turkey.
The broader issue is not the PKK, but Kurdish independence. The Kurds are a
distinct ethnic group divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and, to a small extent,
Syria. The one thing all of these countries have agreed on historically is they
have no desire to see an independent Kurdistan. Even though each has, on
occasion, used Kurdish dissidents in other countries as levers against those
countries, there always has been a regional consensus against a Kurdish state.
Therefore, the news that Turkey is considering targeting the PKK is part of the
broader issue. The evolution of events in Iraq has created an area that is now
under the effective governance of the Iraqi Kurds. Under most scenarios, the
Iraqi Kurds will retain a high degree of autonomy. Under some scenarios, the
Kurds in Iraq could become formally independent, creating a Kurdish state.
Besides facing serious opposition from Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions, that
state would be a direct threat to Turkey and Iran, since it would become, by
definition, the nucleus of a Kurdish state that would lay claim to other lands
the Kurds regard as theirs.
This is one of the reasons Turkey was unwilling to participate in the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. The Americans grew close to the Kurds in Iraq during Operation
Desert Storm, helping augment the power of an independent militia, the peshmerga,
that allowed the Iraqi Kurds to carve out a surprising degree of independence
within Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The Turks were never comfortable with this policy
and sent troops into Iraq in the 1990s to strike against the PKK and pre-empt
any moves toward more extensive autonomy. Before the war started in 2003,
however, the Turks turned down a U.S. offer to send troops into northern Iraq in
exchange for allowing the United States to use Turkish territory to launch into
Iraq. This refusal caused Turkey to lose a great deal of its mobility in the
region.
The Turks, therefore, are tremendously concerned by the evolution of events in
Iraq. Whether northern Iraq simply evolves into an autonomous region in a
federal Iraq or becomes an independent state as Iraq disintegrates is almost
immaterial. It will become a Kurdish homeland and it will exist on the Turkish
border. And that, from the Turkish point of view, represents a strategic threat
to Turkey.
Turkey, then, is flexing its muscles along the Iraqi border. Given that Turkey
did not participate in the 2003 invasion, the American attitude toward Ankara
has been complex, to say the least. On one hand, there was a sense of being let
down by an old ally. On the other hand, given events in Iraq and U.S. relations
with Iran and Syria, the United States was not in a position to completely
alienate a Muslim neighbor of Iraq.
As time passed and the situation in Iraq worsened, the Americans became even
less able to isolate Turkey. That is partly because its neutrality was important
and partly because the United States was extremely concerned about Turkish
reactions to growing Kurdish autonomy. For the Turks, this was a fundamental
national security issue. If they felt the situation were getting out of hand in
the Kurdish regions, they might well intervene militarily. At a time when the
Kurds comprised the only group in Iraq that was generally pro-American, the
United States could hardly let the Turks mangle them.
On the other hand, the United States was hardly in a position to stop the Turks.
The last thing the United States wanted was a confrontation with the Turks in
the North, for military as well as political reasons. Yet, the other last thing
it wanted was for other Iraqis to see that the United States would not protect
them.
Stated differently, the United States had no solution to the Turkish-Kurdish
equation. So what the United States did was a tap dance -- by negotiating a
series of very temporary solutions that kept the Turks from crossing the line
and kept the Kurds intact. The current crisis is over the status of the PKK in
northern Iraq and, to a great degree, over Turkish concerns that Iraqi Kurds
will gain too much autonomy, not to mention over concerns about the future
status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The United States may well be ready to
support the Turks in rooting out PKK separatists, but it is not prepared to
force the Iraqi Kurds to give them up. So it will try to persuade them to give
them up voluntarily. This negotiating process will buy time, though at this
point the American strategy in Iraq generally has been reduced to buying time.
All of this goes beyond the question of Iraq or an independent Kurdistan. The
real question concerns the position of Turkey as a regional power in the wake of
the Iraq war. This is a vital question because of Iran. The assumption we have
consistently made is that, absent the United States, Iran would become the
dominant regional power and would be in a position, in the long term, to
dominate the Arabian Peninsula, shifting not only the regional balance of power
but also potentially the global balance as well.
That analysis assumes that Turkey will play the role it has played since World
War I -- an insular, defensive power that is cautious about making alliances and
then cautious within alliances. In that role, Turkey is capable of limited
assertiveness, as against the Greeks in Cyprus, but is not inclined to become
too deeply entangled in the chaos of the Middle Eastern equation -- and when it
does become involved, it is in the context of its alliance with the United
States.
That is not Turkey's traditional role. Until the fall of the Ottomans at the end
of World War I, and for centuries before then, Turkey was both the dominant
Muslim power and a major power in North Africa, Southeastern Europe and the
Middle East. Turkey was the hub of a multinational empire that as far back as
the 15th century dominated the Mediterranean and Black seas. It was the economic
pivot of three continents, facilitating and controlling the trading system of
much of the Eastern Hemisphere.
Turkey's contraction over the past 90 years or so is not the normal pattern in
the region, and had to do with the internal crisis in Turkey since the fall of
the Ottomans, the emergence of French and British power in the Middle East,
followed by American power and the Cold War, which locked Turkey into place.
During the Cold War, Turkey was trapped between the Americans and Soviets, and
expansion of its power was unthinkable. Since then, Turkey has been slowly
emerging as a key power.
One of the main drivers in this has been the significant growth of the Turkish
economy. In 2006, Turkey had the 18th highest gross domestic product (GDP) in
the world, and it has been growing at between 5 percent and 8 percent a year for
more than five years. It ranks just behind Belgium and ahead of Sweden in GDP.
It has the largest economy of any Muslim country -- including Saudi Arabia. And
it has done this in spite of, or perhaps because of, not having been admitted to
the European Union. While per capita GDP lags, it is total GDP that measures
weight in the international system. China, for example, is 109th in per capita
GDP. Its international power rests on it being fourth in total GDP.
Turkey is not China, but in becoming the largest Muslim economy, as well as the
largest economy in the eastern Mediterranean, Southeastern Europe, the Middle
East, the Caucasus and east to the Hindu Kush, Turkey is moving to regain its
traditional position of primacy in the region. Its growth is still fragile and
can be disrupted, but there is no question that it has become the leading
regional economy, as well as one of the most dynamic. Additionally, Turkey's
geographic position greatly enables it to become Europe's primary transit hub
for energy supplies, especially at a time when Europe is trying to reduce its
dependence on Russia.
This obviously has increased its regional influence. In the Balkans, for
example, where Turkey historically has been a dominant power, the Turks have
again emerged as a major influence over the region's two Muslim states -- and
have managed to carve out for themselves a prominent position as regards other
countries in the region as well. The country's economic dynamism has helped
reorient some of the region away from Europe, toward Turkey. Similarly, Turkish
economic influence can be felt elsewhere in the region, particularly as a
supplement to its strategic relationship with Israel.
Turkey's problem is that in every direction it faces, its economic expansion is
blocked by politico-military friction. So, for example, its influence in the
Balkans is blocked by its long-standing friction with Greece. In the Caucasus,
its friction with Armenia limits its ability to influence events. Tensions with
Syria and Iraq block Syrian influence to the south. To the east, a wary Iran
that is ideologically opposed to Turkey blocks Ankara's influence.
As Turkey grows, an interesting imbalance has to develop. The ability of Greece,
Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey decreases as the
Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very real things, but so is the
economic power of a dynamic economy. As important, Turkey's willingness to
accept its highly constrained role indefinitely, while its economic -- and
therefore political -- influence grows, is limited. Turkey's economic power,
coupled with its substantial regional military power, will over time change the
balance of power in each of the regions Turkey faces.
Not only does Turkey interface with an extraordinary number of regions, but its
economy also is the major one in each of those regions, while Turkish military
power usually is pre-eminent as well. When Turkey develops economically, it
develops militarily. It then becomes the leading power -- in many regions. That
is what it means to be a pivotal power.
In 2003, the United States was cautious with Turkey, though in the final
analysis it was indifferent. It no longer can be indifferent. The United States
is now in the process of planning the post-Iraq war era, and even if it does
retain permanent bases in Iraq -- dubious for a number of reasons -- it will
have to have a regional power to counterbalance Iran. Iran has always been aware
of and cautious with Turkey, but never as much as now -- while Turkey is growing
economically and doing the heavy lifting on the Kurds. Iran does not want to
antagonize the Turks.
The United States and Iran have been talking -- just recently engaging in seven
hours of
formal discussions. But Iran, betting that the United States will withdraw
from Iraq, is not taking the talks as seriously as it might. The United States
has few levers to use against Iran. It is therefore not surprising that it has
reached out to the biggest lever.
In the short run, Turkey, if it works with the United States, represents a
counterweight to Iran, not only in general, but also specifically in Iraq. From
the American point of view, a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq would introduce
a major force native to the region that certainly would give Iran pause in its
behavior in Iraq. This would mean the destruction of Kurdish hopes for
independence, though the United States has on several past occasions raised and
then dashed Kurdish hopes. In this sense, Novak's article makes a great deal of
sense. The PKK would provide a reasonable excuse for a Turkish intervention in
Iraq, both in the region and in Turkey. Anything that blocks the Kurds will be
acceptable to the Turkish public, and even to Iran.
It is the longer run that is becoming interesting, however. If the United States
is not going to continue counterbalancing Iran in the region, then it is in
Turkey's interest to do so. It also is increasingly within Turkey's reach. But
it must be understood that, given geography, the growth of Turkish power will
not be confined to one direction. A powerful and self-confident Turkey has a
geographical position that inevitably reflects all the regions that pivot around
it.
For the past 90 years, Turkey has not played its historic role. Now, however,
economic and politico-military indicators point to Turkey's slow reclamation of
that role. The rumors about Turkish action against the PKK have much broader
significance. They point to a changing role for Turkey -- and that will mean
massive regional changes over time.
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